THE APF & THE 2009 NATIONAL ELECTIONS

Dale Mckinley argues it is premature for the APF to participate in an electoral front that will put up candidates for national elections in 2009.

Ever since the formation of the APF in 2000, there has been a well known and ongoing debate within our movement around participation in elections as well as our strategic and tactical approach to electoral politics. This debate has again resurfaced within our ranks given the 2009 national elections scheduled to take place within the next few months. In the spirit of this ongoing debate and as a specific response to those in our ranks who are pushing for the APF to participate in the 2009 elections as part of a ‘United Front of Socialist Movements & Parties’, I offer the perspectives/arguments below for APF members.

John Appolis has already offered important arguments about the political, organisational and ideological character of the present period in South Africa and how this impacts on the APF’s approach to, and potential participation in, the 2009 national elections. (See article page article page 35). I agree with these arguments and so do not repeat them here.

The efforts of those who are once again pushing for the APF to be part of a formal political electoral ‘front’ to participate in the 2009 national elections as a component of a political party form are fundamentally misplaced. There are several crucial reasons why this is the case:

• Despite our best efforts and modest victories over the least years, those movements and parties who identify themselves as ‘socialist’ are small in number as well as politically and organisationally weak. The APF is probably the largest and most effective of these. In otherwords, the extra-Alliance ‘socialist’ presence in South Africa does not have a mass political and organisational character and even less so, any kind of mass ideological hegemony amongst the broad working class. Neither of these can be ‘built’ or ‘created’ through formal participa- tion in elections. Instead, they can only be built through consistent and militant mass struggle, organising, mobilising and educating on the ground, where people live and work. It is when such mass implantation has been achieved that movements like the APF should then seriously consider utilising the tactic of electoral partici- pation as a means of extending and deepening that mass character and presence into the realm of bourgeois parliaments.

• The opposing argument that participation presents a key opportunity for ‘us’ to ‘expose’ the capitalist parties as well as the bourgeois parliament and its politics is a red herring. Indeed, the very existence and main activities of the APF since its formation are grounded in the continuous exposure of capitalist poli- tics and all the various institutional forms it takes, such as parliament. For socialists, formal participation in national elections is part of a larger struggle to confront and expose capitalist politics and institutions. It is a tactical option to be considered in the context of a particular na- tional balance of class forces, including the state of the left forces considering participation. At this stage in South Africa’s history, the adoption of the electoral tactic by a movement such as the APF is not only premature, given the state of our own organisation as well as the more general balance of forces in relation to ‘socialist politics’, but has the potential to undermine the centrality and impact of the very mass struggles that define the character of the APF as a social movement.

• A decision by the APF not to formally take part in the 2009 national elections as part of a political party seeking votes is not, as some of those supporting participation have claimed, tantamount to “sitting aside and doing noth- ing”. The main question is how does the APF relate to the elections and electoral politics? In this regard, there are several tactical options to choose from. Formal participation is simply one of those choices. The bottom line is that the APF does not need to formally participate in the 2009 elections in order to be socially rel- evant. Nor does it need to participate in order to continue the task of exposing the limitations of bourgeois class rule, or to respond to, build and expand the struggles and needs of its own mass constituency. Instead, the correct tactical choice during this elections period for the APF has three key and parallel components:

1. a) running a campaign of mass mobilisation and struggle to expose the capitalist and reactionary class politics and policies of the Zuma-led ANC in the first place and Shikota and other political parties in the second place and to build and expand our structures and struggles around our basic campaigns;

1. b) together with other social movements and left forces, thrash out an alternative political platform that speaks directly to the national and international balance of forces, the state of capitalist rule and the key demands on the socio-economic and political-institutional questions for the broad working class;

1. c) the above to be placed within a specific campaign for a ‘spoilt ballot’ or protest vote on election day, as a practical state- ment of the overall, pro-active character of our anti-capitalist struggle of the broad working class.

• The practical possibility of the APF gaining any seats in national parliament in the 2009 elections through a formal electoral, ‘socialist front’ is a dream. An example of the serious barriers and challenges to achieve electoral representation is OKM’s campaign in the 2006 local government elections. One proportional representation seat was won on the metro council despite the fact that meaningful human and financial resources were expended and the campaign was waged in communities where OKM’s political, activist and organisational presence was most developed. The history of ‘socialist’ participation in national elections confirms the huge gap between intent and practical outcome. “Two examples: a) the most advanced and capacitated (outside the Alliance) socialist political party formation in this transi- tion, WOZA (in the early-mid 1990s) contested the 1994 elections and received a total of 4169 votes; b) SOPA has contested two national elec- tions. In the 1999 elections they received 9062 votes (0.06%) and in 2004 they received 14 853 votes (0.1%). Not surprisingly, neither secured any representation in national parliament. Both of these socialist parties, even though they had seasoned activists, failed miserably to capture even a miniscule amount of electoral support. Even though one could argue that the present political climate (post-Polokwane politics, split in the ANC etc.) is potentially more conducive to popular receptivity of socialist politics, the possibility for any kind of electoral ‘success’ of a last minute ‘socialist front’ with no sustained mass identity, little organisational presence in most parts of the country and few human and financial resources, is minute.

• Running a national electoral campaign has to take place on a national level, in each prov- ince and with an overall national character). It requires considerable human and financial resources – note that the Workers International Vanguard League has indicated that they would need a minimum of R2 million to run any kind of decent electoral campaign on a national level. The present level of cadreship in the col- lectivity of ‘movements and parties’ that have announced their intention to form an electoral front is incredibly thin and so too are the finan- cial resources. As such, it is no surprise that the APF has become the main ‘target’ for participa- tion in this electoral front, precisely because it contains the widest layer of cadreship and the most fixed financial resources. If the APF’s core human and financial resources are used for any kind of effective and meaningful national elec- tion campaign, the practical impact on both the APF’s short and longer-term ability to carry out its basic functions and central struggles would be devastating.

The very character of the APF since its formation is one of a movement whose purpose and strength is to be found in its extra-parliamentary, mass struggle character. Ideologically, we still remain an incipient ‘socialist’ presence in South Africa. Organisationally, we are a growing yet still qualitatively and quantitatively small collection of highly uneven community organisations trying to consolidate our key struggles and campaigns around basic needs and services.

There may come a point in the future when we have the ideological strength and organisational capacity and the consciousness of the masses has shifted sufficiently to seriously consider shifting our attention and struggles onto the tactical electoral terrain. However, that point is not now. As tempting as it might be to want to enter onto the national electoral terrain in 2009 in the light of the divisions and splits within the ANC and the more generalised crisis of financial capital, we must be serious and mature activists. We need to soberly assess both the subjective and objective realities of our movement and broader society. Ours is a long struggle with no easy electoral short-cuts. It requires patience and perseverance to ensure that both our anti-capitalist ideas and practice become embedded in the everyday lives and struggles of the working class.

In this period, we can best build our alternative ideas and practice as both a social movement and as part of a broader collection of left forces by placing our energies and resources where they can have the most positive impact and force – with the struggles on the ground in poor communities.